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IN 'TH·E SUP.R.EME C0 URT
1

of the

STATE OF U'TAH
HENRY CHILD,
(.
Plaintiff and App.ellant,

vs.

~Case

COY J. HAYWARD and

l

ALDIN 0. HAYWARD,

(

No.
9082

Defendants and Respondents.)

RESPONDEN·T·'S

BRIE~F

STATE~MENT

OF T'HE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff asks for rescission
of a uniform real estate contract, or damages in the
alternative, and for the definition of a boundary line
between the property of the parties.

The case was tried by the ~Court. At the conclusion
of plaintiff's evidence defendants made a motion for
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and granting
defendant's counterclaim for specific performance of
the uniform real estate contract, and defining the
boundary between the property of the parties. This
motion was granted, and plaip.tiff has appealed.
RE~LIE~F

SOl TGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and respondents ask that th<~ Court
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF F A~CTS
In the summel' of 1957, defendant, Aldin Hayward,
and his attorney, Wendell Harnmond, visited property
at the northeast corner of the intersection of Orchard
Drive and 6300 South (also known as \~irginia Lane)
in the 'City of Bountiful, ('11 • ±9) and discussed the
possibility of acquiring the vroperty and building a store
thereon (T. 10). Later, Aldin Hayward began purchasing the various parcels in the area ( T. 9). At the ti1ue,
plaintiff Henry Child owned property contiguous to
that which Aldin Hayward was acquiring, and plaintiff
knew of Aldin Hayward's negotiations with other property owners in the area ( T. 15, 23, 28, 32, 33, 41, 67).
In March or April of 1958, Aldin Hayward contacted
plaintiff and offered to buy some of his land ( T. 11).
Plaintiff was then living in the vicinity of the parcel in
question ( T. 12,) and could see it from his residence
(T. 106). The two men had three or four discussions
about a possible sale (T. 12), and walked over the parcel
together (T. 13, 15, 18). Finally, on an evening in April,
1958 -probably April 4, (T. 42, 43, 126, 142 defendant's
exhibits 1, 5, and 10) -· plaintiff agreed to sell to
Aldin Hayward a parcel bound by a line starting at the
rear of the Eugene Child lot, even with a concrete wall
on the east side of said lot, and running north to the
old Winegar fence, west to a tract which Aldin Hayward
had recently acquired from plaintiff's ex-wife, south
to the rear of the Wallace 'Child lot, and east to the
point of beginning. (T. 19, 39, 40, 52, ·55, 5·6, 58, 157).
The original agreed purchase price was $2,000.00 (T.
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20, -10). The parties iunnecliately went to the home of
.Attorney VVendell Ha1nmond to have their agreement
put in writing ('1 1• 20, 49). Plaintiff there reneged on
the original pureltase price and insisted on $2,500.00.
Aldin Hayward agreed to the increase ( T·. 20, 41).
They described to the attorney the area of the parcel
to be conveyed, and after an infor1nal handwritten Inemoranduin was prepared, they signed it. Aldin Hayward
paid plaintiff $100.00 that night ( T. 16, 25, 50).

Mr. Hanunond thereafter prepared a forinal contract for the parties to sign ( T. 51), with a description
based on the section corner which had been recently relocated by the United States Government (T. 51, 160).
The plaintiff had p~reviously deeded property using that
same relocated section corner as a base (T·. 164). Neverthe less, he objected to the description on the contract
first prepared by Mr. Haininond (T. 53), so Mr. Hammond prepared another formal contract using the old
description (T. 5·6. 58). After the contract was prepared, plaintiff insisted that the concrete wall be referred to in the description and this reference was added
to the contract (T. 58, 112, 115, 11~6, 157). Aldin Hayward and plaintiff signed the contract at Mr. Hanunond's
office and then they took it to the Hayward store where
Coy Hayward, who had entered into the transaction as
a buyer, also signed (T . .+:),59, 65, 66).
The contract (defendant's Exhibit l) contained the
following provision:
When buyers receive deed fro1n seller, they
agree to convey to Eugene Child the south 45
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feet of said tract, by 122 feet east and \Vest, \Vithout compensation therefor.
This provision was inserted at plaintiff's direction and
with defendant's approval (T. '27, 61, 113, 120 to 122,
156). Eugene Child is plaintiff's son. Plaintiff never
disclosed his reasons for \\:anting to pass the 45 by 122
fot tract to Eugene by this rnethod, although a nuinber of possible reasons appear fron1 the evidence ( T. 22,
61, 135).
On April 9, 1958, five days after the parties signed
the first memorandum, Aldin Hayward entered into a
written agreement with Eugene ~Child and his wife,
for the purchase from them of the 45 x 122 foot tract
above referred to, and the rear 21 feet of the Eugene
;Child lot ( T. 29 to 31, 35, 44, 45; defendants' E~hibit 9).
In the latter part of March or early April, 1959,
defendants tendered to plaintiff the first annual payment due under the contract, by a check dated March
26, 1959, in the amount of $580.00. Plaitiff endorsed
this check, and it was paid at the defendants' bank on
April 1, 1959 (T. 142; defendants' Exhibit 5). Almost
3-1/2 years elapsed bet\Yeen the date the contract was
made and the time plaintiff gave notice to rescind ( T.
143; plaintiffs' Exhibit C).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE QUESTION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND
UND'ELIVERED GIFT ARE RAISED FOR iT'HE FIRST TIME
APPEAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
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This Court cannot pass on Inatters which were not
raised in the trial court, but are raised for the first
tiine on appeal. Huber vs. Deep Creek Irrigation Company, 6 Utah 2d 15, .305 P.2d 478 (1956); Pettingill vs.
Perkins, :2 Utah 2d :266, 27:2 P.2d 185 (1954); North
Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water & Irr. co., 118 Utah 600,
~23 P.2d 577 ( 1950).
Plaintiff's co1nplaint sets forth -! causes of action, to
wit:
A. Rescission of the ~contract for fraud.
B. Dan1ages in the alternative to rescission.
C. Defenition of a boundary line between the propperty of plaintiff and defendants.

These causes of action were further explained in
the pre-trial order, which \\Tas prepared by the attorney
for the plaintiff (T. 50 to 53). At the trial plaintiff
abandoned his forth cause of action.
The questions of constructive trust and undelivered
gift were raised at no time until the filing of plaintiff's
brief in this Court. These questions, therefore, cannot
be considered by this ~Court.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF
ACTIONABLE FRAUD, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

The case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Company,
63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924), sets forth the nine
basic elements of actionable fraud. They are:

1. A representation.
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2. Its falsity.
3. Its materiality
4. The speaker's kno\vledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth.
5. His intent that it should be acted upon by the
person and in the manner reasonably contelnplated.
6. The hearer's ignorance of its falsity.
7. I-Iis reliance upon its truth.
8. His right to rely thereon.
9. His consequent and proximate injury.
For further discusion of these principles see Pace
vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952); Oberg
vs. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229· (1947); Auerbach vs. Santuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (19·60).
The party asking for rescission of an executory
contract on the basis of fraud must, therefore, show that
he was induced to part with some legal right, or was
induced to assume some legal liability, \Yhich he otherwise would not have done but for the fraudulent representations which induced the making of the contract.
17A C.J. S. Contracts, Sec. 418 (1).
Plaintiff has failed to prove a single element of
actionable fraud, and did not prove that he parted with
a legal right or assun1ed a legal right.
There \vas no misleading of plaintiff by defendants.
It was plaintiff's O\Vn idea to convey the 45 x 122 foot
tract to Eugene Child in the 1nanner agreed on (T. 27,
61, 113, 120, 122, 156). Defendants neither said anything
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nor did anything to induce plaintiff to part with his land
in this fashion. Plaintiff's clai1n CCo1nplaint R. 2) that
defendants "did thereby deprive the plaintiff from an
honest and full payment for the tract," and also "of
the right to dispose of this tract according to his own
desires" is baseless and false.
Plaintiff's disenchantn1ent with the contract apparently aros e from the fact that his son, Eugene,
spurned his offering, and turned around and sold the
tract to the Haywards. His own testimony is susceptible
of no other interpretation. On examination by his attorney, he stated that he accepted the first annual payInent on the contract and that he refused the second
annual payment. When asked by his attorney to tell
why he refused the second annual payment, he said it
was because he had been deceived, that he had learned
something from the development of the project and
that it appeared that the 45 x 122 foot tract was going
to go to the Haywards (T. 80 to 82). He acknowledged
that the construction work which supposedly tipped hin1
off was begun "first thing" after the contract was signed
(T. 81), that same spring and summer (T. 141), and he
claims that he went to Coy Hayward and told him he
wanted to return the $500.00 and cancel the contract.
But he didn't tell Coy Hayward \\'hy ('~e. 82, 99, 100).
Yet when the first annual pay1nent was tendered to him
some eight months later, he accepted it without protest.
He did send Mr. Hammond back to get interest added
to the check, but he expressed no other objection ('Jl. 80,
81). His testimony, therefore, that he expressed inuned-
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iate dissatisfaction with the contract, is \\'holly unbeliPvable.
On the strength of plaintiff's agree1nent to convey
the 45 x 122 foot tract to Eugene ·Child and the knowledge that they could deal \\'i th Eugene and Wallace
·Child, not only on that tract but on other property, defendants have made and carried out their plans and have
changed their position. Additionally, they have given
consideration to Eugene ( T. 183, 184; defendants' Exhibit 4). Plaintiff, on the other hand, has suffered no
damage or change of position whatsoever as a result
of the transaction between defendants and Eugene Child.
He contracted to convey the land to defendants who
would then convey to Eugene. They stand ready and
willing to do this. Defendants were not to receive any
consideration fron1 Eugene for so doing. Nor was plaintiff to receive any consideration from Eugene (T. 144).
Further, plaintiff did not intend to retain any control
over the property nor exercise any restraint as to what
Eugene might do with it. For example from page 144
of the transcript:

Q.

Now, Mr. ~Child, this 45 x 122 foot tract was
to have been given to Eugene and not sold
to him; is that correct~

A. Yes.
Q. You didn't intend to sell it to him or receive
consideration fro1n hin1 for it; did you~

A. No.
Q. And it 'vasn't your intention to keep control
of the property after you gave it to him
was it~
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A.

Why no. I gave hirn property where his
house is. But if conditions developed that it
was to his advantage and profit, if he wanted
to sell it, of course he could sell it. Yes.

Q. You didn't care what he did with it after he
got it; did you~
A.

Well, it wasn't 1ny place to tell hin1 \vhat
he was to do with it, no. I gave it to him to
use it according to his best judgment, as he
wanted to.

Q. He was free to do with it as he pleased, then;
is that correct~
A. That is correct.
and again at page 149:

Q.

Mr. Child, in accordance with your testimony
that Eugene was free to do what he wanted
with this property, I guess he could have
leased it; couldn't he~

A.

Yes, after it was his property.

Q.

He could have lease it for five years if he
wanted to, or three years~

A. Yes.
Q. Or 99 years~
A. Whatever he wanted to do with it.
and at page 150 :

Q.

I call your attention again, Mr. Child, to your
deposition taken on August 9, 1962, page 28,
your answer to a question concerning your
reason for wanting to rescind this property.
It was as follows. Reading from line 15:
(reading) "No, that isn't the reason. lVfy
reason for wanting to, what do you call it,
1
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A.

rescind that contract is because of the deal
they have with Eugene on the 45 feet by 122
feet, which was defiinitely contrary to 1ny
idea and purpose." Now, that \Vas the problem wasn't it~
Well, yes. That is ''That I have been saying
all the time, that it was not according to my
ideas concerning the property.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff entered into a written contract to sell a
parcel of land to defendants for a price. The contract
was tailor-made to suit plaintiff. The parcel included
a smaller tract which plaintiff wanted defendants to
convey, without charge, to his son. Defendants wanted
the smaller tract and felt that they could deal with the
son and acquire it. They did in fact deal with the son,
after making their agreement with the plaintiff.
For reasons not entirely clear, plaintiff gave notice
of rescission about 3-1/:2 years after the contract was
entered into, and then filed suit on the ground of fraud.
At the trial plaintiff not only failed to bring forward
evidence of all the ele1nents of fraud but failed to prove
any single element of fraud.
In looking at the entire transaction as a \vhole, we
have a situation where plaintiff contracted to sell property to defendants, and defendants agreed to re-convey
the propert~~ to plaintiff's son. Defendants stand ready
and '''"illing to do just that. l:>laintiff cannot complain
if his son thereafter rP-eonveys the property to defendants.
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Respondents therefore respectfully subinit that the
judgment of the Trial'Court should be affirmed and that
:hey should have their costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted
K. Roger Bean
John H. Allen
Attorneys for Respondents
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